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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I discuss accounts of agency, participation, and self-determination by David Crocker and Stacy 
Kosko because they acknowledge that relationships of power can determine who gets to participate and when. 
Kosko usefully applies the concept of agency vulnerability to the case of the self-determination of indigenous 
peoples. I examine the specific context of Canada’s history as a settler nation, a history that reflects attempts to 
denigrate, dismiss and erase Indigenous laws, practices, languages, and traditions. I argue that this history 
displays epistemic injustice in that the dominant collective interpretative resources of non-Indigenous Canadians 
have allowed the dismissal of the collective interpretative resources of Canada’s Indigenous peoples. This gap in 
collective interpretative resources can explain that Canada’s constitution, institutions, laws, and structures reflect 
the dominant collective interpretative resources of a colonizing nation, ones that have delineated and restricted 
the agency, participation, and self-determination of Indigenous Canadians. One important outcome of Canada’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and of its National Inquiry into Murdered and Missing Indigenous Women 
and Girls is bringing the rich history of Indigenous collective interpretative resources and the networks of 
relationships shaped by them to light. By discussing examples from these reports, I give substance to the 
argument that foundational and structural injustices in settler nations are at bottom epistemic injustices, ones that 
have implications for accounts of agency, participation, and self-determination. 
Keywords: agency; self-determination; epistemic injustice; Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission; 
Canada’s National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls 
RESUME 
Dans cet article, je discute des concepts d'agencéité, de participation et d'autodétermination présentés chez David 
Crocker et Stacy Kosko, car ils reconnaissent que les relations de pouvoir peuvent déterminer qui peut participer 
et à quel moment. Kosko applique utilement le concept de vulnérabilité d’agencéité au cas de l'autodétermination 
des peuples autochtones. J’examine le contexte particulier de l’histoire du Canada en tant que nation 
colonisatrice, une histoire qui reflète les tentatives de dénigrement, de rejet et d’effacement des lois, pratiques, 
langues et traditions autochtones. Je soutiens que cette histoire montre une injustice épistémique en ce que les 
ressources interprétatives collectives dominantes des Canadiens non autochtones ont permis le rejet des 
ressources interprétatives collectives des peuples autochtones du Canada. Cette lacune dans les ressources 
interprétatives collectives peut expliquer que la constitution, les institutions, les lois et les structures du Canada 
reflètent les ressources interprétatives collectives dominantes d’un pays colonisateur, lesquelles ont défini et 
restreint l’agencéité, la participation et l’autodétermination des Canadiens autochtones. L’un des résultats 
importants de la Commission vérité et réconciliation du Canada et de son enquête nationale sur les femmes et les 
filles autochtones assassinées ou disparues est la mise en lumière de la riche histoire des ressources interprétatives 
collectives autochtones et des réseaux de relations qu’elles ont créés. En discutant des exemples de ces rapports, 
je donne corps à l’argument selon lequel les injustices fondamentales et structurelles dans les pays colonisateurs 
sont une injustice épistémique fondamentale, des conséquences qui ont une incidence sur les concepts 
d’agencéité, de participation et d’autodétermination. 
Mots-clés : agencéité, auto-détermination, justice épistémique, Commission vérité et réconciliation Canada, 
Enquête nationale sur les femmes et filles disparues et tuées.  
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In this paper, I explore injustices that are foundational, structural, and epistemic and I do so 
in the context of histories and relationships that have shaped Canada as a settler nation. My 
exploration begins by discussing two accounts of agency and participation that I take to 
reach deep into identifying foundational and structural injustices, but I will argue that they 
are not deep enough. On foundational issues, I critically examine David Crocker on agency 
and participation and his skilful manoeuvring through Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum 
to show where he agrees and disagrees with each. I side with Crocker against both—
especially on the role that agency and participation can play at foundational levels of shaping 
and reshaping constitutions themselves. On structural issues, I turn to Stacy Kosko’s 
extension of Crocker’s account of the importance of agency and defend her use of the 
concept “agency vulnerability” as better able to capture the idea that where people are 
situated in relationships of power makes agency more or less possible for them.  
Kosko, rightly I think, argues that a good deal of attention has been given to the substantive 
aspect of defending normative principles underlying constitutions, institutions, structures, 
and the rule of law. Crocker’s project fits the substantive aspect, but he leaves room for fair 
and inclusive participation in deliberations that can challenge and change these. Kosko’s 
project is to tease out the process aspects of how and when participation in decision-making 
processes can happen and she does so in the context of examining the issue of the self-
determination of indigenous peoples. I take her account of agency vulnerability to be an 
important contribution to assessing participation possibilities for indigenous peoples. Yet, 
while Kosko is clear about why agency matters and how it can be thwarted or weakened, 
agency and participation cannot but happen in the context of the foundations of constitutions, 
institutions, and the rule of law already in place in settler nations. In other words, examining 
the process aspect opens up possibilities for assessing the thickness of participation and the 
points of entry for decision-making and helps in understanding whether indigenous peoples 
participate, but it does so in terms that show the limitations of what they can examine, 
challenge, or change. It matters to accounts of fair and inclusive participation that 
constitutions, institutions, and the rule of law are already in place in settler nations and form 
the foundations and structures against which indigenous peoples can exercise their 
(vulnerable) agency and participate meaningfully.  
With Crocker and Kosko, I want to argue that the best accounts of agency and participation, 
ones that reveal where and how foundational and structural injustices can arise, take 
foundations and structures to be fluid rather than fixed and thus open to challenge and 
change. However, devising criteria for enhancing agency and participation is particularly 
difficult in contexts of colonizing/settler nations. In contexts where foundations and 
structures are already in place, a deeper probe into the epistemic injustices that underlie 
substantive and process aspects is in order. To show this, I make use of Miranda Fricker’s 
account of hermeneutical injustice (what I will refer to as epistemic injustice more generally) 
as structural in form because it "occurs at a prior stage when a gap in collective 
interpretative resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage” (2007, 1, my emphasis). 
Departing somewhat from Fricker’s account, I understand the gap to be about the powerful 
creating and controlling the dominant collective interpretative resources so that the collective 
interpretative resources of the less powerful are explicitly or implicitly ignored, dismissed, 
marginalized, or silenced (Pohlhaus 2012; Medina 2012).  
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In the context of settler nations, the dominant collective interpretative resources of colonizers 
have had and continue to have the effect of ignoring, silencing, and marginalizing what 
indigenous peoples say and know about their histories, laws, practices, traditions, and ways 
of life. Claims to know that emerge from failures to credit indigenous peoples’ collective 
interpretative resources, evidenced by laws and structures that have the effect of denigrating, 
dismissing, or erasing that which is perceived to be inferior, mean that epistemic injustices 
lie at the heart of the foundations, structures, and processes that liberal theorists have worked 
to justify and defend.  
Like Kosko, I take up the case of indigenous peoples, for whom concepts of agency and 
participation are seriously tested. But I differ from Kosko in taking context to be of utmost 
significance in the shaping of the histories and legacies of colonialism. A key part of my 
argument is that relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians have been 
shaped and continue to be shaped by a history of colonialism and the injustices and gross 
violations of human rights emerging from the past and continuing into the present. Settler 
nation histories call for a broad and deep account of relationships that shape Indigenous lives 
and communities, non-Indigenous lives and communities, the interactions of Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous peoples and communities and the relationships of all of these to and through 
the state. 
Indigenous collective interpretative resources understand Canada's history to emerge from 
and be shaped by early relationships between the colony settlers and Indigenous peoples who 
negotiated treaties. This history of relationships was examined in and through Canada's 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples mandated to "investigate the evolution of the 
relationship among aboriginal peoples, the Canadian government and Canadian society as a 
whole” (1996 Final Report, 11). These relationships shaped the backdrop to the negotiations 
that set up the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA) in 2006; that gave 
voice to Indigenous experiences in and through the Indian Residential Schools Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (IRSS TRC) with its final report issued in June 2015; and that 
culminated in the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls 
(MMIWG) that named Canada's history one of genocide in its final report issued in June 
2019. These commissions and reports reflect Indigenous perspectives on Canada’s history 
and continue to shape and reshape relationships in Canada as a settler nation. In this paper, I 
focus on some of the complex manifestations of foundational, structural, and epistemic 
injustices in and through some of the lessons learned from Canada’s TRC and the MMIWG 
National Inquiry.  
Before I proceed a few disclaimers are in order. This paper barely scratches the surface of 
what Crocker covers in his appropriately complex conceptual analyses of agency, 
participation, and democratic deliberation or of what Canada’s TRC and MMIWG Inquiry 
have produced. I concentrate on parts of Crocker’s Ethics of Global Development; parts of 
Volume 6 of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada with 
the title, Canada’s Residential Schools: Reconciliation (hereafter cited as TRC Final 
Report); and parts of the Executive Summary of the Final Report of the National Inquiry into 
Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (hereafter cited as MMIWG National 
Inquiry). The upshot is that an examination of epistemic injustice can highlight important 
insights in each of the Crocker, Kosko, TRC, and MMIWG works, but only if a broad and 
full account of relationships as shaped by history, laws, practices, and traditions is kept in the 
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foreground. These relationships have set the terms and processes under which the agency 
and participation of Indigenous Canadians is understood and permitted.  
A final and important claim is that my position is that of a white, privileged woman who 
does not claim to speak for Indigenous Canadians but takes on the smaller task of attempting 
to glean insights about Canada’s history as a settler nation from the TRC Final Report and 
from the MMIWG National Inquiry. This implies three things. First, I limit my analysis to a 
small part of the processes and results and do not claim to cover the work of indigenous 
scholars critical of the TRC or of the MMIWG National Inquiry. I acknowledge, however, 
that these critiques (also of the report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples) are 
important pieces in acquiring a better understanding of relationships between and among 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians and a more accurate and comprehensive account 
of Canada’s history. Second, my analysis reflects my own attempt to do what the TRC, in 
particular, is asking of non-Indigenous Canadians, which is to participate in processes of 
reconciliation by relearning Canada’s history as a colonizing settler nation. Understood this 
way, reconciliation already expands accounts of agency and participation as involving non-
Indigenous Canadians in the very processes of what the TRC set out to do and what it has 
produced. Third, what I have gleaned from the relearning of Canada’s history through its 
TRC cannot be neatly mapped onto the histories of other settler nations. The setting up of 
and results from Canada’s TRC and the MMIWG National Inquiry fits into its own history of 
injustices emerging from past and ongoing relationships and of what to do going forward.  
2. CROCKER ON AGENCY, DELIBERATIVE PARTICIPATION, AND THE ROLE OF 
CONSTITUTIONS 
In Ethics of Global Development, Crocker describes agency as “a normative ideal that 
affirms the importance of the individual and group freedom to deliberate, be architects of 
their own lives, and act to make a difference in the world” (19). Crocker also tells us that 
“his agency-oriented perspective is an effort to build on, make explicit, and strengthen Sen’s 
recent turn to the ideals of public discussion and democratic participation as integral to 
freedom-enhancing development” (2). That Crocker takes “citizen participation and 
democratic decision-making” to be central to an account of agency (19) is important for 
understanding why Crocker sides with Sen and against Nussbaum on the fundamental role of 
democratic participation and deliberation for engaging agents in shaping policies, laws, and 
constitutions themselves.  
Public participation and deliberation are also important to Nussbaum, but her focus is on the 
context of deliberating about the content of the list of capabilities itself. For Nussbaum, the 
list is meant to “provide the philosophical underpinning for an account of basic constitutional 
principles that should be respected and implemented by the governments of all nations” 
(Nussbaum 2000, 5, 51, 116). Crocker argues that Nussbaum fails to fully consider the 
deliberative process of constitution-making itself or the role that citizens and their 
representatives can and should play in this process. In other words, because Nussbaum, 
against Sen, focuses on the need for a list, her emphasis is on nations having the list reflected 
in constitutions and not on democratic processes and citizen participation in the making of 
and revisions to constitutions. Crocker points out that “It is important to observe that fine 
philosophical theories of justice and splendid constitutions do not—by themselves—
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guarantee that a society is just or law-abiding. Asymmetries of power can be just as inimical 
to the rule of philosophers or the rule of law as it is to rule by the people” (357). Crocker, in 
other words, pays attention to the fact that some people and groups can be excluded or 
marginalized in the very projects of creating lists, devising constitutions, or formulating 
policies. In my view, this places the emphasis where it needs to be—agents deliberating 
about injustices and how to address them in the messiness of real-world disagreement, 
conflict, and relationships of power.  
Recognizing the effects of relationships of power calls for accounts of participation and 
deliberation that are fair and inclusive. Against Sen, Crocker recognizes that more is needed 
to have those who are excluded and marginalized heard in ways that can shape public policy. 
This is why Crocker sets out to delineate principles that are meant to regulate and enable 
deliberative participation. These principles are: reciprocity (“each member can make 
proposals and offer justification in terms others can understand and could accept”); publicity 
(“each member be free to engage (directly or by representation) in the deliberative process, 
that the process be transparent to all … and that each know that to which she is agreeing or 
disagreeing”): and accountability (“each group member is accountable to all (and not to 
himself or herself alone) in the sense of giving acceptable reasons to the others”) (2008, 312-
3). Crocker ties these features of democratic deliberation back to agency: “I argue that 
respecting people’s dignity and agency requires not only, as Nussbaum contends, that they 
be free as individuals to form their own conception of the good life; it also requires that 
people have the right and responsibility to form collective values and decide practical 
policies together” (209).  
Crocker also argues that the effectiveness of these principles for addressing existing 
inequalities or for including those who are marginalized in decision-making processes 
require background conditions of equal political liberty, equality before the law, economic 
justice, and procedural fairness (317-8). While Crocker sets out conditions for fair and 
inclusive deliberation, for him constitutions that specify conditions of equal political liberty, 
equality before the law, and procedural fairness are not ideals in the sense that how they are 
employed or understood is fixed. Against Nussbaum, Crocker argues that there are at least 
three ways in which participation and deliberation should happen in the very shaping and 
reshaping of constitutions and institutional structures. First, Crocker notes that citizens and 
group members—acting directly or through their representatives—should deliberate about, 
decide on, and ratify their own constitution. Second, principles of reciprocity, publicity, and 
accountability that allow fair and inclusive deliberation are likely to generate a constitution 
that provides guarantees that protect everyone, that everyone would accept, and that would 
be subject to revision following public deliberation. And third, a democratic and just 
constitution would itself establish and encourage multiple venues for participatory and 
deliberative democracy (203).  
Crocker goes beyond Nussbaum in delineating a role for participatory and deliberative 
democracy both prior to and after constitutions are set. He can be said to recognize that 
agency is compromised when relationships of power in real world contexts thwart fair and 
inclusive participation and deliberation. But can Crocker’s explicit attention to formulating 
principles and conditions for democratic deliberation address the marginalization and 
exclusion of some people and groups or succeed in giving voice to those excluded from 
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exercising political agency? More specifically, can Crocker’s account address vexing 
questions about agency and participation in the case of indigenous peoples in settler nations? 
Devising strategies for ensuring fair and inclusive participation in public discussion is 
important, but we may need to know more to unpack how participation for some is 
undermined and restricted in ways that make it difficult for them to challenge let alone 
reshape public policy that can address the inequalities of the “most marginalized and least 
empowered” (Weir 2005, 311). In the case before us of Canada’s history as a settler nation, 
this will involve digging deep into real world injustices by uncovering norms underlying 
dominant collective interpretative resources. These norms highlight injustices at the 
epistemic level of who claims to know and what they claim to know and they work to 
dismiss, ignore, and marginalize the voices of the most marginalized and least empowered. 
Indigenous Canadians have not been treated as architects of their own lives or as genuine 
participants in public discussion and deliberation about their lives and what matters to them. 
The real question, then, is whether conditions for enhancing agency through participation in 
decision-making processes can happen when a constitution with its institutions, structures, 
and processes is already in place—fixed or not. Does decision-making in these contexts end 
up enhancing agency and participation for some by reflecting the collective interpretive 
resources of European colonizers? Indigenous peoples embedded in histories of colonialism 
will need special attention if agency and participation are to be real and effective. I turn next 
to Kosko’s important contribution to and application of accounts of agency and participation 
in the case of the self-determination of indigenous peoples. 
3. KOSKO ON AGENCY VULNERABILITY, PARTICIPATION, AND SELF-
DETERMINATION 
In “Agency Vulnerability, Participation, and the Self-Determination of Indigenous Peoples,” 
Kosko weaves her way through insights by Denis Goulet and Crocker to map an account of 
when and how agents can meaningfully participate in structuring institutions and processes 
that affect their lives. She asks two questions that shape the argument of her paper. First, 
“ought not the meaning of ‘participation’ for indigenous people reflect their cultural 
traditions of governance, for instance the value they may or may not place on consensus or 
on the role of elders?” (Kosko 2013, 3). Her answer to this is that indigenous peoples “have 
reason to value participatory processes that privilege thicker forms of participation, that 
begin earlier in the decision-making process, that seek consensus, and that include 
mechanisms for the exercise of real power by all involved” (3, my emphasis). Her second 
question asks, “is not the whole point of self-determination to ensure for indigenous peoples 
(at least some degree of) self-rule, rather than simply the generic right to participation that 
minorities, and all members of society, (ought to) enjoy?” (3). Kosko has a two-part answer 
to this question, the second of which is that “self-determination, far from an all or nothing 
condition, is in practice a jigsaw of overlapping jurisdictions in which the degree of self-rule 
can vary from absolute to equally shared, provided that the areas of shared rule are 
consensually shared” (4).  
I agree with Kosko that self-determination need not be all or nothing, but focus instead on 
her account of thicker forms of participation that can be thwarted by “what we might call 
agency vulnerability—the risk of being limited in our ability to control social and economic 
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forces that affect us.” It is a risk that “can remain, perhaps acutely so, even as physical or 
economic vulnerability is greatly reduced” (5). Like Crocker, Kosko takes individual as well 
as group participation to be important for enhancing agency in the very processes of 
decision-making that affect them. In the case of Indigenous peoples, agency vulnerability “is 
intimately connected to an historic loss (that continues today) of sovereignty, and, often 
traditional territory” (7). Kosko then turns to creating a framework that can identify and 
assess when and how in processes of participation the agency of indigenous peoples is most 
vulnerable. While this move may seem to by-pass the issue of self-determination itself, 
Kosko argues that effective participation does not need to be perceived as in tension with 
self-determination in the sense she defends of it being a scalar concept and not all or nothing.  
To show that self-determination in its process aspect of the how of participating is as 
important as its substantive aspect of the what of normative principles that underlie 
constitutions, institutions, processes, or the rule of law, Kosko turns to Crocker’s account of 
seven modes of participation (nominal, passive, consultative, petitionary, participatory, 
bargaining, and deliberative) on the road to defending what she takes to be a thicker mode. 
Crocker rightly rejects thins modes of participation understood as mere membership in a 
group (nominal), or as passively listening to decisions made by others (passive), or as 
providing information that is then evaluated by others (consultative), or as petitioning to 
make decisions that are ultimately evaluated and decided by others (petitionary), or as 
enacting decisions made by others (participatory), or as bargaining with those who make the 
decisions (bargaining). Deliberative participation, on his account, requires “sifting proposals 
and reasons to forge agreements on policies that at least a majority can accept” (Crocker 
2008, 342-344).  
The central point in Kosko’s use of Crocker is that one can evaluate participation in 
decision-making processes from its thinnest at the nominal level to is thickest at the 
deliberative level. Kosko departs from but also builds on Crocker by introducing factors that 
enable an assessment of when groups enter the process. For this she uses Goulet’s account of 
seven entry-points from earliest to latest (diagnosing the problem, listing possible responses, 
selecting the course of action, organizing/preparing to implement the chosen course, taking 
specific implementation steps, correcting/evaluating the course of implementation, debating 
the merits of further mobilization/organization). As Goulet puts it, “if one wishes to judge 
whether participation is authentic empowerment of the masses or merely a manipulation of 
them, it matters greatly when, in the overall sequence of steps, the participation begins” 
(Goulet 1989, 167). Kosko works with both scales to argue that together they offer a way to 
evaluate aspects of agency vulnerability in terms of when participants engage in decision-
making processes and what sort of participation is enabled by those processes: “the key is 
that any process that does not score well on both scales is flawed in some important way and 
its quality as a whole is substantially compromised” (14). 
Kosko then applies the scales of entry points and modes of participation to an evaluation of 
indigenous self-determination. She argues that her framework offers one way to evaluate the 
process aspects of agency and participation “by identifying the points at which indigenous 
peoples enter into the decision-making process with the governments of their respective 
states or other indigenous or non-indigenous populations and the modes of participation 
through which they engage” (14). I think, however, that there cannot but be a tension in the 
conclusions Kosko draws. On the one hand, she rightly argues that the real-world situation of 
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the substantive aspect of constitutions, institutions, and laws being grounded in principles 
and already in place means that “all indigenous peoples, no matter how extensive their rights 
of self-rule, must continue to engage in various forms of ‘shared rule’ with the larger 
society” (14). This cannot but mean late entry into participatory processes for indigenous 
peoples. On the other hand, she acknowledges the difficulty of using her framework in this 
real-world situation: “the equal weight it gives to entry-points speaks directly to the 
requirement that indigenous people be involved in the very establishment of the governing 
order under which they live” (14). 
There is no going back in history to recreate an early entry-point of thick participation for 
indigenous peoples in settler nations. This means that the only source and context for 
evaluating possibilities for the agency and participation of indigenous peoples is the here and 
now of the substantive (liberal) aspects of constitutions, structures, and institutions already in 
place. Kosko’s evaluative framework of the process aspects can only happen in the aftermath 
of the colonialization of indigenous peoples, from which an account of agency vulnerability 
and of a lack of meaningful participation thereby emerges. In other words, Kosko’s scales of 
when and how can only be meaningfully used to evaluate the strength of shared rule: “if (any 
level of) state jurisdiction over indigenous peoples is to be legitimate, then the people must 
consent to these areas of shared rule, which therefore requires early participation in the 
identification of those areas” (14). For now, I will note something I return to later: in the case 
of indigenous peoples in Canada, as learned through the TRC and its aftermath, there were 
early entry points, ones in which Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians participated in 
establishing treaties. 
To be clear, I am not objecting to Kosko’s challenge to the idea of self-determination as all 
or nothing. The value of viewing self-determination as a scalar concept is that it allows the 
kind of evaluation that is important for revealing agency vulnerability in participatory 
decision-making processes for indigenous peoples. Kosko usefully contributes to an 
understanding that “in those areas where shared decision-making remains between 
indigenous peoples and states … we can more easily put the onus on governments to 
demonstrate that a thick concept of ‘quality’ participation is at work in their protection and 
promotion of the wider ‘right of self-determination’” (15). I also agree that “with attention to 
both the entry-point and the mode of participation, governments will better live up to their 
normative and legal obligations toward indigenous people, and those peoples might better 
hope to reduce both their societal and individual agency vulnerabilities” (15). Questions 
remain, however. What is needed to have “governments live up to their normative and legal 
obligations toward indigenous people”? How can governments shaped by and emerging from 
colonial histories come to understand the ongoing threats to agency and participation of 
indigenous peoples? What are the implications for accounts of the agency and participation 
of colonizing peoples themselves? How has Canada’s history as a settler nation shaped past 
and ongoing relationships and how can these relationships be reshaped going forward? 
Adding to and building from Kosko, I am suggesting two things. First, epistemic injustice 
(explained earlier as a gap in collective interpretative resources) is already at work and 
embedded in the foundational and structural injustices that concern both Crocker and Kosko. 
That gap needs to be unpacked to fully grasp what is missing in accounts of agency and 
participation at work in contexts where constitutions and institutions are already in place—
especially in colonizing/settler nations. Second, I agree that foundations and structures (for 
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both substantive and process aspects) should be seen as fluid (rather than fixed and upheld as 
ideals) and subject to challenge and change. However, I suggest that attention to specific 
contexts, particularly with respect to indigenous peoples, can reveal epistemic injustices that 
emerge from histories shaped by relationships between and among indigenous and non-
indigenous peoples within particular settler nations. To grasp what I mean by these two 
things, I turn to a discussion of the setting up of Canada’s TRC and parts of Volume 6 of its 
Final Report with the subtitle Reconciliation. There is a lot to learn about the ongoing 
foundational and structural aspects of epistemic injustice in Canada’s history of the forced 
assimilation of Indigenous peoples. While the TRC does not use the term “epistemic 
injustice,” these ongoing aspects affect what colonizers have ignored/dismissed/erased and 
what can be heard/understood/learned through the TRC accounts of the richness and 
diversity of Indigenous Canadians’ collective interpretative resources.  
The point is not that Indigenous peoples cannot make sense of their experiences. Rather the 
collective interpretative resources they call on make little sense and are of no value to non-
Indigenous Canadians. Their collective interpretative resources were not deemed to be 
resources and were openly targeted for erasure through the Indian Residential Schools 
systems. Their collective interpretative resources have had to be remembered, retrieved, and 
recorded by the many people in communities of Indigenous peoples across Canada in an 
ongoing project of recording Indigenous histories, laws, and practices and the shaping and 
reshaping of these through relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians 
and between Indigenous people and the state. Being aware of these factors as revealing 
injustices of an epistemic sort can shed new light on accounts of self-determination, agency, 
and participation in Canada’s history as a colonizing country. To be clear, I do not reject 
Crocker’s attempt to deepen accounts of agency and participation by opening up possibilities 
for changing and challenging the foundations and structures themselves. Nor do I reject 
Kosko’s contribution that highlights how fraught agency and participation are with respect to 
the self-determination of indigenous peoples. Instead, I am interested in unpacking the range 
and depth of epistemic injustices from the perspective of indigenous peoples—specifically 
the perspectives of Indigenous Canadians as recorded in parts of Canada’s TRC and the 
MMIWG National Inquiry.  
4. CANADA’S HISTORY AS A SETTLER NATION 
Though many non-Indigenous Canadians are aware of the facts that shape the context within 
which Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission emerged from the Indian Residential 
Schools Settlement, interpretations of the facts show fundamental differences in the 
collective interpretative resources of Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians. A strong 
message emerging from the Final Report of the TRC is that for reconciliation to be possible 
at all, non-Indigenous Canadians need to be re-educated about Canada’s history—to unlearn 
what is taught in the official accounts of its history and to learn about the histories of 
indigenous laws, languages, practices, and traditions as told by Indigenous Canadians. Who 
gets to tell/record the “history of Canada” shapes the collective interpretative resources that 
are taken to be legitimate and these, in turn, have shaped and continue to shape the 
relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians. Processes of learning and 
being re-educated about relationships shaped by a colonial past suggest that accounts of 
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agency and participation can be understood to involve the active engagement of all 
Canadians in these processes. 
While this unlearning and relearning was also called for in the multivolume Final Report of 
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1996), that the Government of Canada 
endorsed the uncovering and reporting of the horrors experienced in Indian Residential 
Schools brought these historic and ongoing injustices to public consciousness. The Indian 
Act of 1876 contained a number of clauses that allowed the federal government to establish 
Indian Residential Schools. The result was that, at last count, one hundred and thirty-nine 
federally-supported schools were set up in most provinces across Canada and functioned for 
well over a century. Most schools operated as joint ventures with Anglican, Catholic entities, 
Presbyterian, or United Churches. Indian Residential Schools separated over 150,000 
Indigenous children from their families and communities and had the explicit objective of 
removing and isolating children from the influence of homes, families, traditions, laws, 
languages, and cultures in order to assimilate them into the dominant culture. The last of the 
residential schools closed only in 1996.  
On May 10, 2006, the Government of Canada announced approval of the Indian Residential 
Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA) drawn up with legal representatives of former 
students of Indian Residential Schools, legal representatives of the Churches involved in 
running those schools, the Assembly of First Nations, and other Indigenous organizations. 
The settlement, approved by the Courts and put into effect on September 19, 2007, set out 
five main components: a Common Experience Payment (CEP) for all eligible former 
students of Indian Residential Schools; an Independent Assessment Process (IAP) for claims 
of sexual or serious physical abuse; measures to support healing; commemorative activities; 
and, the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). It is the TRC 
component that is discussed in this paper. 
On June 11, 2008, Prime Minister Stephen Harper, and leaders of the other federal political 
parties, formally apologized in the House of Commons for the harms caused by the 
residential school systems. The TRC part of the settlement began its work in 2008, with 
hearings across Canada that included testimonies from residential school survivors and many 
others who participated in their national events and community hearings. More than six years 
of research culminated in the TRC’s closing ceremonies in Ottawa in June 2015 and a final 
six volume report that outlines the history and legacy of residential schools and puts forward 
ninety-four “Calls to action” identifying concrete steps to be taken on the path toward 
reconciliation. All this to say that the TRC itself can be said to have adopted a broad 
mandate of recording epistemic injustices by gathering the collective interpretative resources 
contained in the histories, laws, practices, and traditions of a diverse range of Indigenous 
communities across Canada.  
The broad mandate also means that Canada’s TRC did not shy away from examining the 
legacy of residential schools, a legacy that emerges from and is reflected in a history shaped 
by a colonial past and colonizing processes, laws, and institutions. The broad relational 
approach that explains the attempted erasure of Indigenous histories, laws, traditions, 
languages, and ways of life and that connects these harms with those in the present goes 
beyond the mandate of what TRCs more generally have been taken to provide. In Our 
Faithfulness to the Past, Sue Campbell identifies several features of what makes Canada’s 
TRC unique: 1) “Canada is a stable democracy, thus not the kind of country in which most 
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people would expect a TRC.” (most TRCs happen in societies transitioning to democracy); 2) 
The IRS TRC emerged “as a part of a comprehensive negotiated settlement among 
Aboriginal peoples, the government of Canada, and church leadership entities.” (most are 
initiated by governments and often in the face of public pressure); 3) The IRS TRC deals 
“with a long period in Canada’s history.” (most TRCs deal with a shorter time period); 4) 
“Many of the kinds of violence and violation at issue in the IRS TRC are unique in the 
contexts of TRCs.” (specific kinds of harms to identity and culture that characterized the 
intent of Indian Residential Schooling); 5) “The direct victims of the harm were children.” 
(142-143). 
On Campbell’s account, Canada’s TRC stands as a rejection of the notion that the past can 
be put in the past. The broad mandate allowed Canada’s TRC to provide a deep 
understanding of ongoing injustices shaped in and through relationships emerging from the 
dominant collective interpretative resources of colonizers. I take this to be an important point 
about the purpose of Canada’s TRC process and aftermath. Mohawk scholar Taiaiake Alfred 
writes: 
In a global era of apology and reconciliation, Canadians, like their counterparts in 
other settler nations, face a moral and ethical dilemma that stems from an 
unsavoury colonial past. Canadians grew up believing that the history of their 
country is a story of the cooperative venture between people who came from 
elsewhere to make a better life and those who were already here, who welcomed 
and embraced them, aside from a few bad white men. (Regan 2010, ix) 
 
The myth of the benevolent peacemaker dominates Canada’s history and continues to be the 
prevailing mindset of non-Indigenous Canadians. What is missed in the dominant framework 
is the deeper relational point that we are all shaped by a history of residential schools that 
had the stated objective, as noted in former Prime Minister Harper’s apology, “to kill the 
Indian in the child” (Government of Canada, 2008). On my account, this means that 
possibilities for agency and self-determination need to be understood against the backdrop of 
their being shaped and reshaped by a colonizing/settler history. 
5. HISTORY, RELATIONSHIPS, AND RECONCILIATION: INSIGHTS FROM THE 
TRC FINAL REPORT AND THE NATIONAL INQUIRY INTO MISSING AND 
MURDERED INDIGENOUS WOMEN AND GIRLS 
 
An overarching message in the TRC Final Report is that the process did not end the work 
that needs doing. Given the history of these historic injustices, the path to reconciliation is 
necessarily long, difficult, and ongoing: 
Reconciliation must become a way of life. It will take many years to repair 
damaged trust and relationships in Aboriginal communities and between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples. Not only does reconciliation require 
apologies, reparations, the relearning of Canada’s national history, and public 
commemoration, but it also needs real social, political, and economic change. 
Ongoing public education and dialogue are essential to reconciliation. (20) 
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There is much more to the TRC’s account of reconciliation than can be covered in this paper. 
For now, I will highlight two points important to explaining that failures to participate in the 
TRC call for learning about Indigenous collective interpretative resources as resources 
points to epistemic injustices emerging from the violent imposition of the collective 
interpretative resources of colonizers. First is the argument that repairing relationships and 
achieving reconciliation is hampered by the “settler within” (Regan 2010). The myth of the 
benevolent peacemaker has shaped Canada’s history and its relationships with Indigenous 
peoples. The myth continues to be a fundamental part of the identities and beliefs of non-
Indigenous Canadians. Confronting and owning it as a myth should be part of the process of 
reconciliation. The call to unsettle “the settler within” makes space for the second point: the 
breadth and depth of the TRC’s understanding of “damaged trust and relationships” moves 
well beyond understanding reconciliation as moving toward a justice respecting society by 
apology alone or by looking back merely to identify perpetrators and make them accountable 
for injustices.  
The 2019 Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and 
Girls adds further breadth and depth to an account of damaged trust and relationships that 
emerged from colonial structures and policies evident in the Indian Act, the Sixties Scoop, 
residential schools, and breaches of human and Inuit, Métis and First Nations rights: 
Colonial violence, as well as racism, sexism, homophobia, and transphobia against 
Indigenous women, girls, and 2SLGBTQQIA [two-spirit, lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender, queer, questioning, intersex and asexual] people, has become 
embedded in everyday life—whether this is through interpersonal forms of 
violence, through institutions like the health care system and the justice system, or 
in the laws, policies and structures of Canadian society. The result has been that 
many Indigenous people have grown up normalized to violence, while Canadian 
society shows an appalling apathy to addressing the issue. (4) 
 
These brief discussions of the TRC Final Report and the MMIWG National Inquiry show 
that the official story of Canada’s history begins with the Indian Act of 1876. However, that 
official story does not give credence to the complex relationships between Indigenous 
peoples and government officials in Canada prior to the Indian Act. As noted in the TRC 
Final Report these relationships were nested in those between Canada and Britain that 
established treaties, treaties that acknowledged and incorporated laws practiced by various 
Indigenous peoples and nations across Canada before settlers arrived. The relationships that 
established treaties are missing in textbooks about Canada’s history: “Indigenous peoples 
have kept the history and ongoing relevance of the Treaties alive in their own oral histories 
and legal traditions. Without their perspectives on the history of Treaty making Canadians 
know only one side of this country’s history. The story cannot simply be told as the story of 
how Crown officials unilaterally imposed Treaties on Aboriginal peoples: they were active 
participants in Treaty negotiations” (TRC, Volume 6, 34).  
This point about Treaties is not about idealising or freezing them in history. Instead the point 
is that the TRC validates these as collective interpretative resources that have shaped and 
continue to shape relationships in Indigenous communities and between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous peoples. Recognizing these as collective interpretative resources suggests that all 
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Canadians have a responsibility as agents “who act to make a difference in the world” 
(Crocker, 19) to participate in collective processes of learning from Indigenous 
communities’ remembering and re-remembering of the past. As Sue Campbell argues, 
memory is about “the many kinds of activities involved in remembering, and about the 
responsibilities of those with whom memory is shared, especially the memory of harm. How 
we participate in and respond to others’ remembering will be part of the context that affects 
how and what people can remember—the significance they are able to give to their past for 
their present and future” (Campbell 2014, 141). Campbell’s account of activities of 
remembering that incorporate ceremonies, traditions, and practices in which stories are told 
and retold is an important feature of the TRC itself—a process of recovering, remembering, 
and recording that which has shaped relationships within Indigenous communities as well as 
those between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. This process of recovering and 
remembering is also evident in the truth-gathering process of the MMIWG National Inquiry 
in which the report notes: “The fact that this National Inquiry is happening now does not 
mean that Indigenous peoples waited this long to speak up; it means it took this long for 
Canada to listen” (MMIWG National Inquiry 2019, 1). 
Listening means learning from these reports that include accounts of “Indigenous peoples’ 
worldviews, oral history traditions, and practices [that] have much to teach us about how to 
establish respectful relationships among peoples and with the land and all living things. 
Learning how to live together in a good way happens through sharing stories and practising 
reconciliation in our everyday lives” (13). Living “together in a good way” is about 
remembering the significance of the past for the present and future. Moreover, these features 
of a broad account of relationships that encompass all living things are evident in the many 
examples of laws, practices, and traditions of various Indigenous peoples; from the Cree, to 
the Inuit, to the Mi’kmaq, to the Métis, to the Anishinaabe, to the Gitxsan, and so on (TRC, 
Volume 6, 54-74). 
Below is a brief description of only one of these examples. The TRC describes the legal 
traditions, principles, and practices of Anishinaabe peoples and the continued relevance of 
these to the broader goal of reconciliation:  
Powerful changes would flow into the reconciliation process if wisdom, love, 
respect, courage, humility, honesty, and truth were regarded as forming the 
country’s guiding principles. If the Seven Grandfather and Grandmother Teachings 
were applied, Canada would renew a foundational set of aspirations to guide its 
actions beyond the broad principles currently outlined in the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms and other constitutional traditions. These teachings would 
help Canadians to build their country in accordance with its formative Treaty 
relationships, which flowed from Anishinaabe and other Indigenous perspectives, 
where peace, friendship, and respect stood at the heart of kin-based ties that 
encouraged the adoption of every newcomer to this land as a brother of sisters. (67) 
 
It is important to add that Anishinaabe peoples incorporate and enact the seven principles 
and teachings into their traditions and ceremonies—including in the context of leaders 
applying them to their own residential school experiences. These ceremonies engage the 
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body and the mind in important activities of recounting past harms, apologizing for 
wrongdoing, and working toward reconciliation.  
Anishinaabe tradition and ceremony play a role that is reminiscent of Campbell’s account of 
memory activities as important for determining the significance of the past for the present 
and future. Moreover, active engagement with others in these activities is meant to repair and 
reshape relationships damaged by harm to self, others, and community. As the TRC points 
out, “if those who have suffered can apologize for their actions in relation to residential 
schools, this might serve as an example for other people throughout this country who have 
not suffered as gravely, and who want to improve their broader relationships” (69). The TRC 
provides other examples of longstanding Indigenous laws and institutions that could inform 
discussions of sovereignty, self-determination, justice claims, and reconciliation and claims 
that “all Canadians need Indigenous law to help us cope with the devastating colonial legacy 
we continue to experience as a nation, of which the residential schools are but one prominent 
part” (61). 
The report of the MMIWG also makes this point about Indigenous law in the context of 
centering relationships as the framework for its National Inquiry: 
Indigenous laws include principles that come from Indigenous ways of 
understanding the world. Relationships are the foundation of Indigenous law, 
which includes rights and responsibilities among people and between people and 
the world around us. Indigenous laws are linked to inherent rights, in that they are 
not Western-based or state-centric. This means that they can’t lawfully be taken 
away by provinces and territories, by the government of Canada, or by the United 
Nations—inherent Indigenous law belongs to all Indigenous communities and 
Nations, and should be respected by all governments including settler and 
Indigenous governments. (13) 
 
The central point emerging from the examples is that collective interpretative resources that 
make sense of the lives, histories, traditions, and practices of Indigenous peoples have 
survived a history of colonizing processes and institutions that have attempted to erase, 
denigrate, and dismiss them.  
Closing the gap between Indigenous interpretative resources and the dominant collective 
interpretative resources that reflect the history, laws, and practices of the colonizer means 
giving credibility to Indigenous interpretative resources as resources that have shaped and 
continue to shape Indigenous relationships, lives, and communities. An important point 
made in the TRC discussion of Anishinaabe principles and ceremonial activities is that these 
collective interpretative resources are relevant to the goal of reconciliation: they can help 
build relationships of mutual respect and move toward “a shared future with a measure of 
trust” (TRC, Volume 6, 91). To ignore, denigrate, or reject Indigenous collective 
interpretative resources displays epistemic injustices that reach to the core of settler nation 
histories. If silenced or not heard, Indigenous interpretative resources are all too easy to 
ignore in assumptions that constitutions, institutions, structures, and the rule of law are 
foundational and represent the histories and experiences of all Canadians. 
The TRC understanding of reconciliation calls for treating Indigenous peoples as agents 
active in and responsible for the shaping of their own lives—in the past, present, and into the 
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future: “Aboriginal peoples must be recognized as possessing the responsibility, authority, 
and capability to address their disagreements by making laws within their communities. This 
undertaking is necessary to facilitate truth and reconciliation within Aboriginal societies” 
(TRC, Volume 6, 51). I take this to be the kind of self-determination that Kosko defends 
when she calls on governments to “demonstrate that a thick concept of ‘quality’ participation 
is at work in their protection and promotion of the wider ‘right of self-determination’” (15). 
Correcting for epistemic injustice means treating Indigenous Canadians as agents and giving 
credibility to the collective interpretative resources of survivors of colonial processes and 
institutions.  
The perspectival aspect of collective interpretative resources explains the epistemic gap in 
terms of what the dominant perceive/know and fail to perceive/know. Indigenous Canadians 
are now filling the epistemic gaps between what Indigenous Canadians know about their 
own lives and what non-Indigenous Canadians claim to know from the perspective of 
dominant collective interpretative resources. The final reports of the TRC and MMIWG 
National Inquiry can be read as understanding agency and participation in terms of 
Indigenous peoples remembering, recording, and enacting collective interpretative resources 
that can give meaning to a right to self-determination. The final reports also ask non-
Indigenous Canadians to engage in a collective project of sharing, recording, and acquiring a 
more accurate account of Canada’s history as a settler nation and the damaged trust and 
relationships emerging from this history.  
6. LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT FOUNDATIONAL, STRUCTURAL, AND EPISTEMIC 
INJUSTICES 
Indigenous laws, languages, traditions, and practices have been dismissed as having no value 
or credibility—as is abundantly clear in the attempted erasure of Indigeneity through 
residential schools. Many of the ninety-four calls to action recommended by the TRC are 
about giving authority and voice to Indigenous peoples—by changing existing government, 
legal, and public education institutions as well as the media, sports, and business sectors so 
as to reflect Indigenous histories, laws, practices, languages, and traditions; by increasing 
access to and participation in economic, social, and political spheres in ways that respect 
Indigenous peoples and their lands and resources; and by providing education at all levels 
and for all Canadians about the history of Indigenous peoples, the legacy of residential 
schools, treaties, Indigenous rights and laws, and Indigenous communities’ relations with the 
state. 
Both the TRC and the MMIWG National Inquiry point out that Canada’s constitution, laws, 
structures, and institutions emerge from the Indian Act of 1876 that determined the treatment 
of Indigenous peoples and thereby restricted possibilities for self-determination, agency, and 
participation: 1) The Act determined what counted as “Indian status” and denied status to 
many Indigenous women (“a denial of home, but also a denial of connection to culture, 
family, community, and their attendant supports. …the intergenerational and 
multigenerational effects of the Indian Act have erected barriers to their cultural and physical 
safety” (24)); and, 2) The Act set up residential schools across Canada. These two aspects of 
the effects of the Indian Act on Indigenous women and girls and of residential schools 
intersect in that residential schools enforced the unlearning of Indigenous histories, laws, 
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traditions, and practices and thereby resulted in intergenerational trauma and damage to 
relationships in families and communities. These relationships, in turn, shaped and continue 
to shape relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. This can explain 
why both the TRC and the MMIWG National Inquiry took on the broad mandate of 
examining all aspects of the effects and aftermath of the Indian Act in the lives of women 
and girls and in residential schools by also retrieving and recording the histories of 
Indigenous laws, practices, languages, and traditions.  
One can have ideals of how constitutions, institutions, and processes for enhancing 
participation in the construction and reconstruction of these are vital for respecting agency, 
but actual laws as set out by colonizing settlers have the effect of shaping what counts as 
legitimate and lawful actions, practices, structures, and institutions as well as what counts as 
justifiable moral reasons and constraints on agency itself. I have suggested that Crocker’s 
accounts of agency and participation usefully challenge what is assumed or taken as given 
with respect to the role of constitutions, institutions, structures, and the rule of law. I have 
also suggested the important contribution that Kosko makes in her account of agency made 
vulnerable in the late entry points for meaningful participation in the case of indigenous 
peoples. I have argued that these accounts of self-determination, agency, and participation 
are challenged and stretched further in a settler context such as Canada.  
The TRC Final Report reveals gaps in making sense of collective interpretative resources 
when the focus is on the state and its constitution, institutions, and laws. These gaps, I argue, 
reveal the places where epistemic injustices are embedded in the kinds of relationships that 
shape the very individuals and collective interpretative resources of the more and the less 
powerful and the relationships between them. These factors add a deeper relational analysis 
to Kosko’s account of agency vulnerability and of assessments of the when and how of 
indigenous self-determination and participation. I have argued that foundational and 
structural injustices in settler nations are at bottom epistemic injustices, ones that reach to the 
foundations and structures of a colonizing/settler nation and have implications for accounts 
of agency, participation, and self-determination. 
Ami Harbin captures what underlies the tension in Kosko’s account of entry points for 
assessing the participation of indigenous people in settler nations when she writes, “the 
destruction of indigenous lands, knowledge, families, and sovereignty cannot ever be fully 
rectified, because people, knowledge traditions, languages, the health of lands, and the 
original possibility of trusting, respectful treaty relationships have all been lost and cannot be 
recovered intact” (Harbin 2016, 141). One of the goals of Canada’s state sanctioned TRC 
process as well as of the MMIWG National Inquiry is the attempt to recover these 
histories—not intact, but with a renewed call and commitment for all Canadians to take up 
the challenge and responsibility of participating in a process of learning and relearning 
Canada’s settler history of state imposed attempts to dismiss and erase indigeneity and what 
all of this means for how to go on.  
The TRC process and the MMIWG National Inquiry have permitted Indigenous peoples and 
nations to retrieve, hear, participate in, and learn about the histories, laws, practices, and 
institutions that have shaped their worldviews and their communities. I would add that this is 
especially important as societies and countries learn more about histories and contexts that 
have failed to acknowledge past injustices or to learn about how these injustices shape and 
continue to shape relationships of inequality and power. The positive part of what the final 
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reports of the TRC and MMIWG National Inquiry have achieved in remembering, retrieving, 
and recording is ongoing—in Indigenous nations across Canada, in Indigenous communities 
learning and relearning laws, languages, histories, and practices, and in centers and 
universities set up to collect this research. It is also ongoing in its call to Indigenous and non-
Indigenous Canadians to participate in projects of understanding, relearning, and rewriting 
Canada’s history. The MMIWG National Inquiry identifies some 100 “Calls for Justice for 
All Governments” (62-104) that identify ways in which Indigenous self-determination can be 
strengthened by engaging in various initiatives at all levels of international, national, 
provincial, public service and law sectors, educational and health institutions, and 
Indigenous communities. Self-determination for Indigenous Canadians means that 
“Indigenous understandings of culture are deeply rooted in their own identities, languages, 
stories, and way of life—including their own lands—and these ways of knowing must be 
recentred and embraced as ways to move forward” (25). I take this to give substance to 
Crocker’s account of agency as “individual and group freedom to deliberate, be architects of 
their own lives, and act to make a difference in the world” (19) and to Kosko’s account of 
the self-determination of Indigenous people. 
Harbin writes, “for settlers in anti-colonial social movements, the goal is not only supporting 
indigenous resurgence but decolonizing our own ways of thinking about nationalism, history, 
property, resources, state governments, immigration, and so on. Settlers might be called to 
challenge our own colonial thinking on many levels, all of which can require ongoing 
reminding and re-correcting” (141-2). Such a call to action for settlers expands an 
understanding of agency and self-determination, and of the processes and conditions that 
could lead to fair and inclusive public deliberation. Elsewhere I have argued for an expanded 
account of agency, one that shows agency to be shaped interdependently and as needing to 
make use of emotional, relational, and rational capacities in participatory processes of 
responding to our own lives and the lives and needs of others (Koggel 2019). The 
implications of this expanded account of agency can be applied to the case before us. It is an 
account that ties agency to participation by affirming the importance of Indigenous and non-
Indigenous agents acting interdependently “to make a difference in the world” (Crocker, 19). 
I take the MMIWG National Inquiry and the TRC to envision ongoing processes of 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians working interdependently in participatory 
processes of drawing on agential capacities of emotionality, relationality, and rationality in 
an ongoing effort to “be architects of their own lives” (Crocker, 19). 
I conclude by returning to the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous 
Women and Girls centering relationships as its framework and focal point for what can be 
done going forward:  
a key teaching repeated throughout the Truth-Gathering Process is about the power 
and responsibility of relationships. As those who shared their truths with the 
National Inquiry emphasized, understanding what happens in relationships is the 
starting point to both understanding and ending the violence against Indigenous 
girls, women, and 2SLGBTQQIA people. … family members insisted that to 
understand and honour those whose lives were violently cut short requires a careful 
accounting of all the relationships that shaped their loved one’s life and that their 
loved one, in turn, played a part in shaping. (10)  
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This call for understanding how past and ongoing relationships have shaped and continue to 
shape lives and communities is directly connected with how the National Inquiry 
understands self-determination: “women and 2SLGBTQQIA people themselves should be 
able to actively construct solutions that work for them, according to their own experiences. 
Self-determination also means fundamentally reconsidering how to frame relationships that 
embrace the full enjoyment of rights across all aspects of community and individual life, and 
within First Nations, Métis, and Inuit and settler governments” (11).  
Falling back on a defence of the normative principles underlying the structures, institutions, 
and processes imposed and now place in settler nations is not enough in the face of the huge 
challenges presented by a call for a way of life committed to repairing relationships in and 
among Indigenous communities and between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians: 
“finding justice for those victims and preventing violence for the future rest in a fundamental 
reorientation of relationships among Indigenous women, girls, and 2SLGBTQQIA people, 
society, and the institutions designed to protect them” (MMIWG National Inquiry, 40).  
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